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Abstract—This paper presents an adaptive steganography
scheme for Voice over IP (VoIP). Differing from existing steganography techniques for VoIP, this scheme enhances the embedding transparency by taking into account the similarity between Least Significant Bits (LSBs) and embedded messages.
Moreover, we introduce the notion of Partial Similarity Value
(PSV). By properly setting the threshold PSV, we can adaptively
balance the embedding transparency and capacity. We evaluate
the effectiveness of this scheme with G.729a as the codec of the
cover speech in StegTalk, a covert communication system based
on VoIP. The experimental results demonstrate that our technique provides better performance than the traditional method.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, steganography has drawn increasing attention.
Many different steganographic methods for storage media
(e.g., image [1], audio [2], text [3], etc.) have been proposed in
the last few years. However, the area of steganography for
real-time systems is largely unexplored. In part due to the fact
that the real-time characteristic of real-time systems is a
double-edged sword. While the real-time nature potentially
offers better security for secret messages by virtue of its instantaneity, it does not allow many complex operations, which
increases the difficulty in assuring security. Nevertheless, given its potential advantages, steganography for real-time systems may soon become a worthy subject of further studies. In
this paper, we focus on one of the typical real-time communication systems, Voice over IP (VoIP), as a possible carrier to
apply steganography to provide security for secret messages.
VoIP is a promising technique to enable telephone calls
via a broadband Internet connection. Owing to its advantages
of low cost and advanced flexible digital features, VoIP has
become a popular alternative to the public-switched telephone
network (PSTN), and extensive research on it has been conducted [4]. The main motivations for our VoIP-based steganography study are twofold. First, the ongoing conversation of
VoIP can offer an ideal camouflage for secret messages, because the voice data is naturally assumed to be the only data
carried in a given VoIP channel. Second, a typically short
VoIP connection does not give eavesdroppers a sufficient
amount of time to detect possible abnormity due to hidden
messages. Recently, some researchers have noticed the advantages of and carried out useful studies on steganography over
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VoIP [5-9]. However, all of these studies adopt the same simple embedding strategy, replacing the least significant bits
(LSBs) of the cover speech with the binary bits of secret messages or their encrypted form without leveraging the characteristics of LSBs. Although LSBs modifications usually have
little impact on the quality of cover media, blind substitution
potentially risks being detected by statistic methods. This view
has been widely accepted by researchers working on steganography on storage media [10-12]. In fact, the key criteria for
steganography are perfect transparency to non-authenticated
entities and high capacity for carrying secret messages. The
first criterion, a measure of embedding distortion, is often
more important. An acknowledged belief is that the smaller
the embedding distortion, the harder the detection of the embedding changes. Therefore, in this study, we focus on an
adaptive steganography scheme for VoIP, which aims at minimizing the distortion of speech quality to enhance the imperceptibility of the steganography system. While the pursuit
of transparency is bound to decrease the capacity, as is well
known, we are interested in proving an acceptable balance
between these two criteria.
To make this paper self-contained, in Section II, we briefly
summarize the necessary background of VoIP steganography
and formally define some of the concepts discussed in this
paper. The proposed adaptive steganography scheme for VoIP
is described in Section III, which is followed by the evaluation
of this scheme and its test results that are presented in Section
IV. The paper is concluded with remarks on the paper’s main
contribution and future work in Section V.
II.

BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION

Fig.1. The framework of VoIP steganography

Fig. 1 depicts a general framework of VoIP steganography.
Let us assume that Alice (the sender) wants to transmit some
secret messages to Bob (the receiver), while they are talking
about some inconspicuous topics via the VoIP system. For that,

Alice hides some secret messages into the VoIP stream with
an embedding algorithm; after the voice is sent through the
VoIP channel, Bob retrieves the secret messages with the corresponding restituting algorithm.
Based on the traditional definition of steganography [13],
we formally describe VoIP steganography as follows:
Definition 1 (VoIP Steganography): Given the quadruple
Ø = <C, M, D, E>, where C is the set of VoIP packet (VoIP
stream), M is the set of secret messages with |C| ≥ |M|, E: C
× M → C represents the embedding function and D: C → M
represents the restituting function. A system with the property
that D(E(c, m)) = m for ∀ c ∈ C and m ∈ M is called a VoIP
steganography system .

Thus we must strike an acceptable balance between transparency and capacity. On the other hand, the selection of LSBs
in this approach cannot be fixed beforehand and may even be
uncertain, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for the
receiver to determine which LSBs conceal the secret messages.
The main idea behind our proposed new steganography approach, which attempts to strike a good balance between embedding transparency and capacity as detailed next, stems
from these observations.

Let us assume that, M = {m1, m2, …, mL} is the bit set of a
given secret message (it may be encrypted beforehand, which
is irrelevant in this scheme), where L is the length of the secret
message; B = {b1, b2, …, bN} is the LSB set of each VoIP
packet, where, N is the total number of LSBs, and the selecAs in most practical steganography systems, the two tion of LSBs can refer to previous methods [9]. We divide B
communication parties in the VoIP steganography system also into S parts, namely, B = {B'1, B'2, …, B'S}, where B'i = {b'i1,
must exchange secret messages without raising any suspicions. b'i2, …, b'in}, i = 1, 2, …, S; n = N/S; b'ij = b(i – 1) ·n + j, j = 1,
Therefore, we should guarantee the perceptual similarity be- 2, …, n. Accordingly, we divide M into Q parts, i.e. M = {M'1,
tween the cover and the corresponding stego-object (the cover M'2, …, M'Q}, where M'i = {m'i1, m'i2, …, m'in}, i = 1, 2, …, Q;
embedded with secret message). The authors in [13] defined Q = L/n; m'ij = m(i – 1) ·n + j, j = 1, 2, …, n. Further, we define the
following partial similarity function:
perceptual similarity via a similarity function as follows:
Definition 2 (Similarity Function): Let C be a non-empty
set. A function sim: C2 → (- ∞ ,1] is called the similarity
function on C, for x , y ∈ C, if x = y, sim(x, y) = 1; otherwise,
sim(x, y) < 1.
Further, the transparency criterion for steganography can
be formally described that for ∀ c ∈ C and m ∈ M maximizing the value of the following function:
f (c, m) = sim(c, E (c, m)) − 1

(1)

The LSBs substitution has a premise that the modification
of LSBs is not enough to induce perceptual distortion. However, the selection of LSBs often largely depends on subjective opinions. Thus, the potential ineffectiveness of LSBs
substitution on covers cannot be ignored, especially when employed in applications with high security requirements. In the
following text, we will present a novel adaptive steganography
approach for VoIP, which enhances the embedding transparency by taking into account the similarity between LSBs and
embedded messages.
III.

THE ADAPTIVE STEGANOGRAPHY SCHEME FOR VOIP

Let us consider the following hypothetical case: if the LSB
stream of the cover speech is exactly the same as the bit
stream of secret messages to be embedded, the steganography
has the best transparency without any induced distortion of
speech quality, i.e. f(c, m) reaches its maximum value 0. This
observation suggests that an ideal cover may be obtained if its
LSBs match perfectly with the binary bits of the secret messages. However, it is impossible to find such an ideal match
for most given secret messages, making this approach impractical. Another possible approach is to only replace the portion
of LSBs that are equal to the binary bit of secret messages.
This, however, will inevitably sacrifice the embedding capacity of the cover speech in favor of good transparency, which
may not be a significant concern if the cover speech sufficiently long. Unfortunately, the length of the cover speech depends
on the conversation, which is often short and unpredictable.

ε ( X , Y ) = count ( xi = yi )

(2)

where, X = {x1, x2, …, xT}, Y = {y1, y2, …, yT}, T is the
length of X and Y, xi, yi = 0 or 1, i = 1, 2, …, T. It means that
the value of ε(X, Y) is the number of identical bits between X
and Y. If X and Y are one part of B and M respectively, the
value of ε(X, Y) is called the Partial Similarity Value (PSV).
If the threshold PSV is set as η, for ε(X, Y) ≥ η, X can be replaced with Y, and for ε(X, Y) < η, X is not changed. This
process can be formalized as follows:

⎧ X , If ε ( X , Y ) < η
X y = ϕ( X ,Y ) = ⎨
⎩ Y , If ε ( X , Y ) ≥ η

(3)

Accordingly, function (1) can be converted into:
f ( X ,Y ) = ε ( X ,Y ) T −1

(4)

For the given threshold PSV η, the condition of replacing
X with Y is f(X, Y) ≥ η/T – 1.Obviously, if η = T (in this case, T
= n), the embedding process has the best transparency but the
smallest capacity; if η = 0, the embedding process can achieve
the maximum capacity but the minimum transparency. However, we can adaptively balance the transparency and capacity
via properly setting the threshold PSV for the given n. Fig. 2
illustrates this adaptive embedding process.
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Fig.2. The adpative embedding process

In our scheme, the problem of how to tell the receiver the
adopted LSBs is tantamount to how to indicate the embedded
parts in each VoIP packet. Our solution is to set a flag bit for
each part in every VoIP packet. According to the aforementioned definition, we need S flag bits, denoted by FB = {fb1,
fb2, …, fbS}. fbi (i = 1, 2, …, S) can be determined as follows:
⎧⎪1, If ε ( X y , Y ) = n
fbi = ⎨
⎪⎩0, If ε ( X y , X ) = n

(5)

In the above formula, fbi = 1 indicates that the ith part has
been replaced, otherwise, the ith part has not been changed.
Obviously, if we divide B into more parts, we will need more
flag bits. As far as the number of flag bits is concerned, a
smaller S is preferable. However, the number of parts can also
impact the performance of embedding, because the embedding
transparency and capacity depend on the values of parameters
n and η. Therefore, choosing a proper S involves a difficult
tradeoff. In this prototypical scheme, we determine parameter
S empirically. Another problem is where to place these flag
bits. In our previous study [13], we present a synchronization
mechanism using techniques of the protocol steganography, in
which synchronization patterns are hidden in the unused
and/or optional fields of the header of a certain packet. In the
IP header, there are a total of 64 bits that can be used to embed
messages. Moreover, the headers of upper-level protocols,
such as UDP, RTP, etc, also have many unused or optional
fields. Therefore, the sender can distribute the flag bits among
those fields in a predetermined manner. Because the flag bits
are often few and altered continually, such a transmission of
flag bits is potentially hard to discover. The receiver knows
exactly where the flag bits are embedded. When the receiver
receives an IP packet, he (she) first checks for every flag bit,
and then extracts the corresponding hidden parts. After collecting all these parts, the receiver can successfully restitute
the whole secret message.
IV.
TABLE I.
Mode
1
2
3
4
5

EVALUATION AND TEST
STEGANOGRAPHY MODES
Description

Choosing 8 bits of LSBs in each frame and direct replacing
them with secret message bits
Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and direct replacing
them with secret message bits
Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and adaptive embedding secret message bits with n = 4, η = 2.
Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and adaptive embedding secret message bits with n = 4, η = 3.
Choosing 16 bits of LSBs in each frame and adaptive embedding secret message bits with n = 4, η = 4.

We evaluate the proposed scheme in StegTalk [9], a prototypical covert communication system based on VoIP. StegTalk supports typical coders, such as ITU-T G.711, G.723.1,
G.729a, etc. In the tests, we typically choose G. 729a [14] as
the codec of the cover speech. Similarly, we define the LSBs
based on the observation that the parameters of fixed codebook in G.729a have the best transparency for information
hiding [9, 13]. Our tests focus on performance comparison

between the traditional LSBs substitution method and the proposed adaptive steganography method. Thus, we design five
steganography modes as shown in TABLE I. The first two
modes are based on the traditional LSBs substitution method,
and the rest are based on the proposed adaptive steganography
method. In what follows, we describe the results of the tests on
a single phrase of speech and some audio samples.
A. Test One

Fig.3. Spectrograms contrast

In the test, we compare the spectrograms of the cover
speech without steganography and with steganography for
each mode. We choose the phrase “It is nice to meet you” as
the cover speech (denoted by P) and ISCAS 2009 CALL FOR
PAPERS file (CFP15v.pdf) [15] as the secret message. After
being encoded by G. 729a, P has 126 frames. TABLE II
shows the lengths of the hidden secret message in each mode.
Fig. 3 shows the spectrograms of the original speech and its
steganographical versions with the secret message embedded
in five different steganography modes respectively. From
them, we can observe the following facts: (1) the spectrogram
for Mode 2 shows the most visible differences from the original spectrogram, indicating that Mode 2 has the worst transparency. However, it provides the largest embedding capacity; (2)
the spectrogram for Mode 5 is exactly the same as the original
spectrogram, because the embedding process does not change
any bits. However, it provides the smallest embedding capacity; (3) the spectrograms for Mode 1, Mode 3 and Mode 4
show relatively minor differences from the original spectrogram, which indicates that the speech quality degradations in
these modes are negligible. Among them, Mode 4 offers the
best transparency as it has fewer differences than the others
but at the cost of embedding capacity. Mode 1 and Mode 3
can provide nearly the equal transparency, but Mode 3 offers
larger embedding capacity than mode 1 (about 1.43 times).
Therefore, Mode 3 keeps the best balance between embedding
transparency and capacity; and (4) based on an overall consideration of transparency and capacity, the proposed adaptive
steganography method provides better performance than the
traditional LSB substitution method.
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TABLE II.

STEGANOGRAPHY CAPACITY AT EACH MODE

Mode 1

Mode 2

Mode 3

Mode 4

Mode 5

1008 bits

2016 bits

1444 bits

588 bits

128 bits

B. Test Two
To further compare the performances of the traditional
LSBs substitution method and the proposed adaptive steganography method, we collect 150 one-minute audio samples.
These samples consist of three categories: male speech, female speech and piano music. All the samples are recorded
with 8000 HZ sampling rate, 16 bits quantization and mono,
and encoded by G. 729a before the embedding process. For
each sample, we perform the steganography experiment in the
above five modes respectively. The secret message (also
choosing CFP15v.pdf, actually only some forward parts) can
be successfully embedded and retrieved in any case. Furthermore, for the evaluation of the embedding transparency, we
also carry out Mean Opinion Score (MOS) [16] experiments
on all steganographical samples. MOS is a mapping of perceived levels of distortion into the descriptive terms "excellent,
good, fair, poor, unsatisfactory". Accordingly, MOS value is
defined within the range of [1, 5]. Generally speaking, MOS
value of speeches encoded by G. 729a is 4.0 [14].

quality of steganographical piano samples is still acceptable.
Therefore, the adaptive steganography can be employed reliably and effectively in the VoIP steganography system.
V.

In this paper, we proposed an adaptive steganography
scheme for VoIP. The salient advantage of this scheme is that
it can adaptively balance the embedding transparency and
capacity. Moreover, experimental results demonstrate that our
method outperforms the traditional LSBs substitution method.
For further work, we will study the effect of both parameter n
and parameter η. Furthermore, the impact of latency induced
by the steganography scheme on real VoIP conversations will
be investigated.
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